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Abstract— Denial of service attacks (DoS) can cause significant financial damages. Flooding and Malicious packets are two 
kinds of DoS attacks. This paper presents a new security approach which stops malicious packets and prevents flooding in the 
critical systems. New concepts of packet stamp a dynamic-multi-communication-point mechanism has been identified for this 
proposed approach to make the prevention of flooding attacks easier and the performing of malicious packet attacks harder. In 
addition, dynamic key encryption technique has been adapted as a part of the proposed approach to enhance its functionality.  
Index Terms— flooding, malicious packet, dynamic-multi-points-communication, packet stamp, denial of service.  
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1 INTRODUCTION
echnologies in the information age provide vast op-
portunities for organizations to transform their ser-
vices into the digital arena. For some organizations, 
like government departments, which have very critical 
systems, security is one of the important factors to pro-
vide online services. Information availability is one of the 
important security goals. It means that providing services 
should be uninterrupted by malicious DoS [1], [2], [3], [7]. 
According to Kim and Kim in [18], communication priva-
cy is one of the importance principals for a critical system 
to provide online services, so a strong encryption me-
chanism must be used to achieve this goal. The Internet 
has been designed to maximise its functionality to pro-
vide communication, and its security was not considered 
to be a major factor [6]. Recently, DoS attacks against 
highly visible Internet sites or services have become 
commonplace [4]. So attacks have been a danger to the 
Internet operations, and they have caused significant fi-
nancial damages [3][5]. According to the 2009 CSI Com-
puter Crime and Security Survey report, 29.2% of the res-
pondents detected DoS attacks directed against them, 
with the respondents representing that the DoS attacks 
were the most costly cyber attack for them [8].  
DoS caused by IP packet floods is one of the major 
problems faced by Internet hosts. It is nearly impossible 
to stop packets addressed to the host. IP routers respond 
to dropping packets arbitrarily when an overload hap-
pens. But the question is which packet should be dropped 
[9]. So, flooding attacks are hard to detect [10]. It can ef-
fortlessly degrade the Quality of Service (QoS) in the 
network and leads to the interruption of critical infra-
structure services [15]. Flooding attacks are a serious 
threat to the security of networks that provide public ser-
vices like government portals [16]. They are more difficult 
to fight against if the IP has been spoofed [17]. Flooding 
attacks are easier to be committed when the encryption 
data is included in the security solutions, because an ad-
dition of overload process for communication comes from 
encryption and decryption of the data [18].  
Malicious packet attack is a type of the DoS attacks.  It 
also called malformed packet attack. It occurs when the 
attacker sends incorrectly formatted packets to the victim 
system to crash it [30].There are two types of malicious 
packet attacks: packet address attacks and packet 
attribute attacks [30]. These kinds of attacks are conti-
nuously growing, because the attackers identify the limi-
tation of protocols and applications from time to time 
[31]. Some solutions have been developed to defence 
against malicious packet attacks. However attackers are 
continuously searching for system vulnerabilities to 
commit new malicious packet attacks [32]. Hackers today 
are trying to find systems vulnerabilities by generating 
random packets, which have different attribute possibili-
ties [32]. Old malicious packet attacks can also still be 
found [31]. One reason for that is because some of the 
new operating system and devices are vulnerable for 
some of the old attacks. For example, the beta version of 
Windows Vista was vulnerable to a number of old vulne-
rabilities [32].   
In this paper, a new security approach, which is Holis-
tic Approach for Critical System Security (HACSS), is 
proposed. It is designed for critical systems like govern-
ment portals. In these systems, higher availability of ser-
vices and higher privacy of communication are important 
principles. The HACSS is identified to support these sys-
tems’ availability by preventing DoS attacks like flooding 
and malicious packet attacks, and to enable a suitable 
encryption solution. In this paper we will illustrate how 
the HACSS deals with flooding and malicious packet at-
tacks in these systems. 
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Many of DoS attacks come from packets. In the 
HACSS, the connection is designed to be controlled by 
the server, thus the client’s packets are designed by the 
server. In addition, this approach divides the communica-
tions with clients into two groups: communication with 
authenticated clients and communication with non-
authenticated clients. These two groups communicate 
with the system via two separate channels. This division 
helps the system to expect what kinds of packets should 
be received in each part, and it also helps the system to 
design the suitable solution to stop malicious packet at-
tacks and to prevent flooding attacks.  So this approach 
should stop all existing malicious packet attacks, and it 
will prevent a lot of future malicious packet attacks. The 
HACSS identifies a new concept which we call packet 
stamp technique. This technique is designed to stop mali-
cious packet attacks from authenticated clients. So the 
system can provide services like uploading files or receiv-
ing messages while stopping malicious packet attacks. In 
addition, the HACSS enables a new dynamic-multi-
points-communication mechanism, which makes the pre-
vention of flooding attacks easier, and it makes it easier to 
stop spoofed malicious packet attacks. In addition, this 
approach includes dynamic key encryption to prevent 
sniffing, which leads to flooding attacks and reuse packet 
attacks which is kind of malicious packet attacks. These 
kinds of attacks occur when the attacker sniffs an authen-
ticated client’s packets, and then resends a packet many 
times to the server with slightly changed attributes. 
The next section will further describe flooding and ma-
licious packet attacks and will also discuss related works 
as security against these kinds of attacks. Then the pro-
posed approach and its components will be explained in 
Section 3. The last section, will discuss how this HACSS 
will prevent flooding attacks and how stopping malicious 
packet attacks, and will also evaluate the HACSS in pre-
venting flooding and in stopping malicious packets. 
2 BACKGROUND  
DoS attacks are committed by using victim resources to 
slow down or stop a key resource (CPU, bandwidth, buf-
fer, etc) or more of these victim resources. The goal of 
DoS is either slowing down or stopping victim resources 
from providing services to the clients [6]. In the following 
two subsections, we will descuss how both of these at-
tacks can be committed. In addition we will illustrate 
some of the previous solution against each of them.    
2.1 Flooding attack 
 Flooding is one kind of DoS attacks. It occurs when an 
attacker sends an overpowering quantity of packets to a 
victim site. Some victim key resources might be crashed 
or delayed from responding as a result of handling this 
quantity of packets [6] as shown in (Fig. 1) below. Encryp-
tion of communications is a significant feature that must 
be included in critical system security designed to achieve 
confidentiality [14]. However, strong encryption might 
lead to flooding, because the system needs more time to 
process an encrypted packet that might be dropped. 
Dropping flooding packets from their headers is the ea-
siest solution.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Flooding attack 
 
There are some methods designed to prevent flooding 
attacks. One of the existed techniques is an active queue 
management policy. As a queue management policy is 
applied on to the server, the size of a backlog queue in-
creases depending on the availability of the system re-
sources, and the timeout period would decrease. So the 
number of free slots will increase in the backlog queues 
for new requests. Random Drop (RD) is another method 
to solve the problem of flooding attacks. It randomly rep-
laces a new request with a request which was stored in 
the backlog queue when the backlog queue is full [19].  
Both of these methods are designed to receive new re-
quests after flooding is happened or about to happen. The 
active queue management policy solution expands the 
availability of the queue, to handle new requests depend-
ing on the system resources. However, if the system re-
sources are limited, or if the queue was already expanded 
with no free slots, the system will still face a potential risk 
of flooding attacks. Also in RD solution, there is a risk 
that right requests might be replaced with attackers’ re-
quests. So the flooding attack problem is still unsolved, 
and both the solutions are based on the system resources 
capabilities. Neither of them makes any change in the 
system design or process to handle more requests by us-
ing the same existing resources. With these issues, it is 
necessary for any future solution to consider the ways to 
save system resources availability to handle more flood-
ing attacks requests.    
 2.2 malicious packet attack   
The attacker might use the victim’s system vulnerabilities 
to commit DoS attacks [6]. Network protocol vulnerabili-
ties are identified repeatedly from time to time. The sys-
tem might be vulnerable to receive a malicious packet, 
which might crash its protocol. The attacker creates this 
malicious packet by changing packet’s attributes, so the 
receiver protocol fails to handle this packet and loses its 
consistency [20]. All protocols are softwares which are 
written using programming languages. As in any pro-
grams, they might have vulnerabilities which can be in-
fluenced by some malicious inputs [21]. Usually these 
kinds of products have been tested strongly for potential 
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vulnerabilities. However, some input vulnerabilities are 
often found in these protocols after they were used. More 
new attacks might be discovered in the future, as these 
new attacks are uncovered by these programs. In addi-
tion, some protocol vulnerabilities come from the specific 
nature of the languages with which the protocols have 
been written [22].  
Malicious packets are also a threat to the Internet, as 
various software vulnerabilities allow attackers to achieve 
remote control of routers in the Internet [23]. Malicious 
packet attacks could be more powerful when it is used 
with other attacking techniques, like shorter distance 
fraud. This kind of attacks might disrupt network com-
munication completely. Existing network protocols might 
not be able to detect malicious packet attacks [23]. 
Most of existing solutions against malicious packet at-
tacks depend on filtering the malicious packets and 
dropping them [29], [26], [27], [28]. The difference be-
tween these solutions is in the method of finding mali-
cious packets. One category of these methods is based on 
the analysis of packet headers using intelligent algorithms 
to detect malicious packets. Decision Tree is an example 
for this category. It is simple data mining method, which 
is designed like a tree which consists of branch nodes. 
Each node represents a choice from a number of alterna-
tives, and every leaf node represents a class of data. It has 
learning algorithms to take a decision about packets. For 
malicious packet attacks, the learning data contains every 
encoded data of malicious packet attacks [25].  The 
second category is simply designed to find malicious 
packets using some rules, which describe likely attributes 
of malicious packets. Deep Network Packet Filtering is 
one example for this category. It works as multi layered 
filtering according to some rules based on the past known 
attacks that. It could be implemented in the firewall, or as 
a special equipment, such as a intrusion detection system 
[24]. 
The above solutions are essentially based on the tech-
niques to find and drop potential malicious packet at-
tacks, and they are open to receive any malicious packet. 
For the first category of these techniques, must be enough 
powerful for existing malicious packet attacks, also they 
were designed to find future packet attacks. However, 
these types of solutions do not guarantee to stop new 
packet attacks, because some of the future packet attacks 
may not be detected by their intelligent algorithms. The 
second category only deals with the existing malicious 
packet attacks. So, some of the future packet attacks 
might be not cached by these methods. 
3 HOLISTIC APPROACH FOR CRITICAL SYSTEM 
SECURITY (HACSS)  
In this section, an overview of the HACSS will be illu-
strated. In addition, each component of the HACSS will 
be described, and communication of these components in 
each of them will also be explained.  
3.1 An overview of HACSS 
As in the figure below (Fig. 2), our approach consists of 
two main components, Client Authentication (CA) and 
Authenticated Client Communication (ACC). Each one of 
these components is responsible to communicate with the 
client, depending on the stage in which the client com-
municates with the system. This division is important to 
identify the nature of clients’ communication activities 
with the system, and this helps to give an appropriate 
powerful solution for flooding attacks in every part of the 
system. In addition, this division helps to give an appro-
priate powerful solution for malicious packet attacks in 
every part of the system also. So the system can provide 
securely all required communication services. Each com-
munication service is provided through a specific part of 
the system. 
Client authenticity and services providence for clients 
will be determined in the first component. Filtering and 
Redirect Engine is the first element in this component. It 
receives clients’ requests, filters them, and accepts only 
correct requests. The second element in the CA compo-
nent is Ticket Engine. It authenticates clients and issues 
different categories of tickets for them. A ticket’s category 
is determined based on the services that the client can be 
provided with.  
 
 
   Fig. 2. HACSS Approach 
 
Depending on the client satisfaction in the CA compo-
nent, all communications for authenticated clients are 
moved to the ACC component. In this component, all 
clients’ packets will be examined, and whole massages 
will be checked. It consists of five main elements, which 
are Authenticated Client Engine, Packet Manager, Stamp 
Engine, Determine IP Serve Engine, and Massage and File 
Checking Engine. The first four elements work together to 
accept only authenticated clients’ packets, to design 
clients’ packets, and to examine received packets. The 
Massage and File Checking Engine element checks all 
received clients’ messages.  
3.2 Client Authentication  
The CA component handles all unauthenticated clients’ 
requests (Fig. 3). It filters clients’ requests, authenticates 
clients who hold these requests, and issues tickets for 
each client depending on the services that each client can 
receive. Only correct requests are accepted to be 
processed in the system. The CA provides a secure chan-
nel to the client while it is authenticating the client. Each 
client is required to provide his/her signature to 
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represent his/her identity.  All invalid signatures are 
added to a list. After the client is authenticated, a ticket 
will be issued for the client. The type of the ticket issued 
depends on the type of services the client is supposed to 
receive, and this is decided by the server.  
  
Fig. 3. HACSS Architecture 
  
The CA contains two main parts: Filter and Redirect 
Engine and Ticket Engine. The Filter and Redirect Engine 
filters clients’ requests, and the Ticket Engine will be re-
sponsible for the Clients’ authentication. This Engine also 
communicates with Signature Issuing and Verification 
(SIV), a third party government organisation who is re-
sponsible for issuing signatures. In the following section, 
each part of this component will be explained. 
3.2.1 Filter and Redirect Engine 
Filter and Redirect Engine is the main window for the 
system to communicate with unauthenticated clients, and 
it provides a secure channel during their authentication 
stage. It has a minimum number of functions. This helps 
to prevent flooding and minimize the possibility of re-
ceiving malicious packets. Filter and Redirect Engine is 
responsible for the following tasks (Fig. 4):  
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Fig. 4.Filter and Redirect Engine  
 
1. It receives all unauthenticated clients’ requests. In 
order to protect this area from malicious packet, these 
requests must be in a specific format and size and 
unencrypted. Any request does not match these crite-
ria will be dropped. In addition, it processes only one 
request for a source in a specific time to stop flooding 
from the source. However this duration of time is 
changed dynamically, depending on the number of 
clients. This helps to prevent a client from engaging 
in the system for long time when this client’s IP is 
spoofed. This function will be discussed later in this 
paper.  
2. It sends its public key to the client after a correct 
client’s request is received. This key is useful because 
the client’s signature must be encrypted using this 
key when the signature is sent to the system. This 
will prevent sniffing and spoofing for that signature.  
3. Each signature is checked by a function which is pro-
vided by the SIV. This function is used to check the 
signature’s form and format. However this function 
is not responsible for validating signatures. The Filter 
and Redirect Engine receives this function from SIV 
through a secure channel. 
4. It sends new correct signatures to the Ticket Engine 
to authenticate them.  
5. When it receives a new invalid signature, it adds this 
signature to a black list which contains invalid signa-
tures, and then it will request the client to renew its 
signature. Any received signature must be checked 
against this list before it is processed. This list con-
sists of two columns for invalid signatures and num-
bers of times each invalid signature has been spoofed 
(Fig. 5).  This list is sorted by the second column ac-
cording to the frequency. Though these signatures 
are correct in format, they are no longer valid at the 
SIV. Additions of new signatures to the list take place 
after the signatures were rejected by the SIV. Al-
though the checks against this list might be done par-
tially, this still drop invalid signatures that might be 
used many times by attackers, and this also prevents 
other parts of the system from being occupied by ex-
cessive workload caused by these invalid signatures. 
6. When a client is authenticated, the Filter and Redirect 
Engine sends the master key (encrypted by the 
client’s PKI) to this client for dynamic key encryption. 
It also sends the next IP which this authenticated 
client can use to continue communication. This IP 
was determined by the Determine IP Serve Engine.  
Signature No of Times 
Sign. 5 456 
Sign. 101 430 
Sign. 6 399 
.... .... 
Sign. n 1 
 
Fig. 5. Black Signatures List 
 
7. It drops any request from clients who are authenticat-
ing or have been authenticated. So it stops flooding 
that is caused by spoofed and reused packets of those 
clients. In addition, it also drops any request which is 
not in the specified format. Because it only accepts 
one request at a time from a source, it drops all fol-
lowing packet from that source during that time. It 
also drops incorrect signatures and any received sig-
Part of the list 
will be 
checked 
 18 
 
natures which exist in the black list of invalid signa-
tures.   
The HACSS adapts the dynamic key technique to en-
hance our approach to stop DoS attacks by preventing 
packet sniffing. A dynamic key is a private key that is 
based on one time password technique. This technique 
will change the key for every packet. So it will be hard for 
the attacker to crack the keys [11], [12], [13].  
3.2.2 Ticket Engine 
The Ticket Engine authenticates clients’ signatures and 
issues tickets for them (Fig. 6). This takes place through 
several steps. (1) It only receives valid clients’ requests 
with their correct signatures. (2) It validates each client’s 
signature by communicating with the SIV. (3) If the signa-
ture was invalid, it requests the client to renew his/her 
signature through the Filter and Redirect Engine, and add 
the invalid signature to the black list of invalid signatures 
in the Filter and Redirect Engine. (4) When the client’s 
signature is valid, the Ticket Engine negotiates with the 
server about the details of a ticket with which this client 
can be granted. (5) After issuing the ticket for the client, a 
notification will be sent to the Filter and Redirect Engine 
that the client has been authenticated. Also it will send 
the authenticated signature to the Determine IP Serve 
Engine, which is in the ACC, to determine an IP with 
which this client should continue communication.  
 
  
   Fig. 6: Ticket Engine  
3.3 Authenticated Client Communication (ACC) 
This is the second component of the HACSS. It only 
communicates with authenticated clients via a full dy-
namic key encryption channel. In addition, it uses dy-
namic-multi-points-communication. This mechanism 
seeks an appropriate communication for each client by 
dynamically changing between multiple IPs. Each packet 
that arrives to the system must come through a specific 
IP. The ACC designs clients’ packets, checks received 
packets, and checks whole clients’ messages and files be-
fore they are sent to the server. In the following sections, 
each part of this component will be explained. The roles 
of each part of this component in the system are illu-
strated in the figure (Fig. 7).  
  
Fig. 7. Authenticated Client Communication (ACC)  
3.3.1 Authenticated Client Engine 
This engine consists of more than one IP. Each IP handles 
only specific packets and requests from the specific 
clients. These specific packets and requests are deter-
mined by the Determine IP Serve Engine. Every unex-
pected packet will be dropped at this stage. After each 
client’s communication with the system, the client should 
receive a next IP that can be used to continue further 
communication. This mechanism provides a layer of 
packets filtering from their headers. In addition, this 
represents a filter layer for the malicious packet address 
attacks (Fig. 8).  
 
Fig. 8. dynamic-multi-points-communication 
 
In Fig. 8,  received a communication packet from 
Client a and Packet b. The communication was accepted 
and was passed to the Packet Manager Engine, because it 
had been accepted by. However the Packet b was 
dropped because it had not been expected in this IP. On 
the other hand, in  the communication from Client c 
was dropped and Packet b was accepted, because the Pack-
et b had been expected in this IP and communication from 
the Client c was not. 
The communication between the client and the ACC is 
fully encrypted using dynamic key mechanism. To pre-
vent flooding attacks, the ACC performs several steps in 
its communication with clients (Fig. 9). (1) When a client 
wants to pass a message or upload a file to the server, it is 
requested to provide specifications of the message or the 
file, such as size, file name, etc. (2) When these specifica-
tions are received, they will be passed to Packet Manager. 
(3) Authenticated Client Engine receives packets’ stamps 
and their IPs from the Packet Manager, and then sends 
them to the clients. (4) It receives packets only from the 
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clients that have stamps and their details attached to the 
encrypted part of the packet, as shown below in the fig-
ure (Fig. 10). (5) It receives a notification from Determine 
IP Serve Engine about clients’ requests and packet speci-
fications that the Authenticated Client Engine should re-
ceive for each IP. (6) It sends the next IP with which the 
client can continue further communication. (7) It drops 
any packet which has not been expected by the receiver 
IP, so the Authenticated Client Engine drops spoofed 
packets after they were decrypted.  
 
 
(1)File or m
essage
spe. request
(4)Stam
ped packet 
(2)File or m
essage Spe.
 
Fig. 9. Authenticated Client Engine  
 
Packet Header Packet 
header Stamp  
Data 
Source Dest. Size ..... 
 
 
Fig. 10. Client’s Packet  
3.3.2 Packet Manager:  
It is one on the important parts in the system that de-
signed for the HACSS to stopping malicious packet at-
tacks. It designs packets for the authenticated clients, so 
the system should not process any unexpected packet 
from them. It is responsible for the following tasks (fig. 
11).  
1. It receives specifications of each message or file 
to determine the number of packets that are re-
quired for the client to upload files or pass mes-
sages to the server.  
2. It also determines the attributes for each packet 
which can be used as packet headers.  
3. Each determined packet’s header is sent to the 
Stamp Engine in order to issue a stamp for the 
packet.  
4. It receives encrypted stamps for packets from the 
Stamp Engine. 
5. The Packet Manager also sends each packet 
header to the Determine IP Serve Engine to speci-
fy from which IP this packet should be received.  
6. It receives determined IP from the Determine IP 
Serve Engine for each packet.  
7. The Packet Manager then sends all the appro-
priately determined packet headers, stamps and 
IPs through to the client.  
8. When the packet has been received from the Au-
thenticated Client Engine, it will be checked by 
the Packet Manager, so the Packet Manager is re-
sponsible for stopping duplicated packets. 
9. It sends received packet to the Stamp Engine. 
 
(5) packet’s header
(6) Determined IP for a packet
 
Fig. 11. Packet Manager Engine  
3.3.3 Stamp Engine: 
Stamp Engine is responsible for issuing stamps for pack-
ets and verifying stamps of the packets. Any authenti-
cated client packets will be dropped unless they have 
specific stamps. Each stamp is issued by the Stamp En-
gine must have following characteristics:  
• Stamps should represent the packet’s attributes. 
Which are encrypted by the Stamp Engine.  
• Each stamp should be different from others.  
• Each stamp must represent the packet.  
• A stamp must show its issuing date and time in case 
of stamps were reused.  
• Each stamp must be encrypted so it is not readable. 
Stamping packets technique is designed for the 
HACSS in order to stop malicious packet attacks. It is the 
main malicious packet filtering for authenticated clients’ 
packets. The Stamp Engine performs the following tasks 
(Fig. 12): 
1. It receives packet’s header from the Packet Man-
ager Engine. 
2. It issues an encrypted stamp for the packet, and 
then sends this stamp to the Packet Manager En-
gine.  
3. It receives clients stamped packets which have 
stamps from the Packet Manager Engine. 
4. Once a packet is received, its stamp will be de-
crypted by the Stamp Engine. 
5. Then the Stamp Engine will check the stamp’s is-
suing date and time. If the details were satisfacto-
ry, then Stamp Engine will verify if this stamp 
represents its packet. 
6. When the stamp represents its packet, then this 
packet will be moved to Massages and File Check-
ing Engine. 
If the stamp’s issuing date and time are not correct, or 
the stamp does not represent the packet, the packet could 
be a malicious packet. The communication with that 
client then must be stopped, because this client is trying 
to perform a denial of service to the system.  
 
Encrypted data 
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Fig. 12. Stamp Engine  
3.3.4 Determine IP Serve Engine:  
Determine IP Serve Engine determines the next IP with 
which the client should communicate after the client has 
been authenticated, and it also determines appropriate 
IPs for authenticated clients while communicating with 
the Authenticated Client Engine. Also it determines to 
which IP each packet should be sent. Each IP should re-
ceive a notification from the Determine IP Serve Engine 
about which clients should be served, and also which 
packets should be received by. In addition, it also main-
tains load balance between these IPs. 
3.3.5 Messages and Files Checking Engine: 
This component can be a virtual memory or separated 
device. It receives client packets, collects them and checks 
the whole message or file. It has a combination of security 
checking tools and programs like ant-viruses. After a 
message or file has been checked, it is sent to the server. 
When a file or a message has a malicious code or another 
threat, it will be dropped and then stop communication 
with the client. 
4 DISCUSSIONS ON SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY OF 
THE HACSS  
This section shows how the HACSS helps to prevent 
flooding attacks and to stop malicious packet attacks. Al-
so the proposed approach and the existing methods will 
be compared. In addition, an efficiency analysis of im-
plementing the HACSS will be conducted to evaluate the 
system in terms of flooding prevention and of malicious 
packet stopping. 
4.1 Security Analysis  
Clients can communicate with the system through two 
areas, namely the Filter and Redirect Engine and the Au-
thenticated Client Engine. The following two sections will 
discuss the efficiency of these two areas in the proposed 
approach for both flooding and malicious packets attacks. 
4.1.1 Preventing flooding attacks 
In this section, the HACSS in preventing flooding for the 
Filter and Redirect Engine and the Authenticated Client 
Engine will be discussed. Also the proposed approach 
and the flooding prevention existing techniques will be 
compared.  
4.1.1.1 Filter and Redirect Engine 
In this part of the system, the HACSS is designed to pre-
vent flooding by implementing different techniques to 
address the following: 
1. The HACSS minimises the number of system 
processes for a client’s request in order to process 
the same quantity of requests using less the exist-
ing resources. So it can handle a more number of 
requests at a time. So the system will be harder to 
attack by flooding. This will be discussed in the 
Efficiency Analysis section (4.2). 
2. The Filter and Redirect Engine processes only 
one request for a source in a specific time. This 
decision makes the system to prevent flooding. 
Usually the flooding attacker repeats sending a 
flooding packet which is generated with its ma-
chine protocol. So the source for these packets 
will be the same. Then the flooding from that 
source will be stopped. But in the case that the 
flooding attacker changes the source of these 
packets manually or using a program, the system 
should be faster to drop these packets, because 
generating packets manually or with such pro-
grams should significantly reduce the number of 
packets sent to the system. However, the dura-
tion of time to stop a specific source is changed 
dynamically, depending on the number of clients 
who are served on that time. This benefits the 
system and the client by preventing the clients 
from connection in case this client IP is spoofed 
in the system. This will also be discussed in the 
Efficiency Analysis section (4.2). 
3. Usually flooding comes from unauthenticated 
clients. Once the client is authenticated, it will be 
moved to the Authenticated Client Engine. So 
more processes will then be made free to prevent 
flooding in this area.  
4. The Filter and Redirect Engine has a function 
which is provided from the SIV. This function 
can be used to know the correct formats of the 
signatures. This process should be simple and fo-
cus on the signatures’ formats to find incorrect 
signatures by using less process. This should pro-
tect the system from losing time to handle incor-
rect signatures.   
5. The Filter and Redirect Engine has a black list 
containing invalid signatures. This list prevents 
the system from spending time to communicate 
with the SIV to verify invalid signatures. Also the 
sorting in this list saves time to find invalid sig-
natures that were frequently used. 
These pervious techniques are incorporated together to 
save time for the system to find incorrect requests for 
which the system should not spend much time. This 
saved time becomes important when more flooding at-
tacks are received. So the availability of the system should 
be higher and the system should be less likely vulnerable 
against flooding attacks. 
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4.1.1.2 Authenticated Client Engine 
In the Authenticated Client Engine, the dropping of 
flooding is easier, because in the dynamic-multi-points-
communication, the packet headers prescribe the action to 
be taken. Also the Authenticated Client Engine address 
the following points: 
• Because each IP already knows from which source 
the request or the packet should come, the Authenti-
cated Client Engine drops any received request or 
packet that is not expected to be received. This tech-
nique saves time of processing flooding attacks, and 
this saved time will be helpful when more quantity of 
flooding occurs. This will be discussed further in the 
Evaluation Efficiency section for possible implemen-
tation.  
• In the case a packet is spoofed and sent to the correct 
IP, the packet will be dropped after it decrypted, be-
cause the source and destination in the encrypted 
part will be incorrect.  
The active queue management policy, which was men-
tioned in the previous section (2), increases the size of the 
backlog queue to offer more free space for new requests 
to prevent flooding. Also the RD flooding solution drops 
queued requests randomly to create more space for new 
requests. The limitation in these techniques is that the 
system is still limited by its resources.  So actually this 
solution just uses the maximum existing resources to im-
prove the system availability. However the HACSS 
changes the functionality of the system so it can serve 
more requests at a time within the same system resources. 
This happens, as discussed above, by offering a solution 
to drop adversary flooding attacks with less process. So, 
more availability of the system’s resources is saved in 
case more flooding occurs in future. So the HACESS im-
prove the availability of the system by enhancing the ca-
pability of the same system’s resources to handle more 
quantity of flooding.  
4.1.2 Malicious packet attacks 
In the Filter and Redirect Engine, most communication 
services are stopped. Only the communication services 
for client authentication run in this part of the system. 
This is particularly effective because required many kinds 
of malicious packet attacks cannot be committed unless 
the system’s vulnerable services are running. Limiting the 
services thus reduces the risk of the system being at-
tacked by malicious packets attacks in this area. In addi-
tion, all clients’ requests and communication in this area 
are limited and must be in specific formats and size, oth-
erwise they will be dropped before they get into the sys-
tem. 
On the other hand, all required communication servic-
es are running in the Authenticated Client Engine. Each 
client can use any one of these services depending on 
his/her ticket. Usually the attacker commits the malicious 
packet attack by sending a packet with changed 
attributes. When the system protocol was vulnerable for 
this change then a malicious packet attack would occur. 
Using stamp mechanism which was designed for the 
HACSS, the acceptance of this change can be avoided, 
because the system assigns these attributes and ensure 
that they have not been changed. Also though checking 
these attributes is done for each packet before collecting 
packets of each message or file, because some malicious 
packets have correct attributes for their packet levels, but 
it might be vulnerable for the system when the system 
tries to join them together.   
Usually, malicious packet attacks are committed by 
unauthenticated clients. This kind of clients cannot com-
municate with the system through this part, unless an 
authenticated client packet was spoofed. If so, the chance 
of this packet getting into the system is low, because the 
Authenticated Client Engine uses the dynamic-multi-
points-communication technique. If this packet was ex-
pected by the receiver IP, then it will be dropped after 
decrypted, because the header attributes will be included 
in the encrypted part. If the dynamic key encryption was 
encrypted, this malicious packet will be dropped by the 
Stamp Engine because its stamp will be incorrect. 
From the above analysing, we can see that the HACSS 
should stop all current and future malicious packets, es-
pecially in the Authenticated Client Engine, because the 
client’s packets are designed by the server side. If the au-
thenticated or unauthenticated client tries to send a mali-
cious packet to the server, this packet will be found mali-
cious from its stamp. 
In the following table (Table 1), the two previous solu-
tions, Decision Tree and Deep Network Packet Filtering,  
mentioned in the section 2 will be compared with the 
HACSS. 
 
TABLE 1  
COMPARING THE TWO TECHNIQUES OF STOPPING MALICIOUS PACKET AT-
TACKS WITH HACSS 
 
 
Defence 
against exist-
ing attacks 
Defence 
against new 
attacks 
Guarantee all 
correct packet will 
be passed 
Decision Tree YES NOT SURE NO 
Deep Network 
Packet Filter-
ing 
YES NO YES 
HACSS YES YES YES 
 
Table 1 shows that all the three solutions against mali-
cious packets attacks can stop all the existing malicious 
packet attacks. However, the Deep Network Packet Filter-
ing cannot stop new malicious packet attacks, because it 
was designed to find the existing malicious packet at-
tacks. The Decision Tree was designed to find new mali-
cious packet attacks by using learning algorithms to take 
a decision about packets. However, this algorithm does 
not guarantee to stop all future malicious packet attacks. 
The HACSS on the other hand should stop all future ma-
licious packets, because most of the client’s packets are 
designed and checked by the server side. The Deep Net-
work Packet Filtering and the HACSS should guarantee 
that all non-malicious packets will be passed. On the oth-
er hand, the Decision Tree might drop non-malicious 
packets, because its learning algorithms might take incor-
rect decision. From Table 1, we can say that the HACSS is 
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an enhanced solution to stop malicious packet attacks. 
4.2 Efficiency Analysis 
In this section, the performance of the HACSS to prevent 
flooding and to stop malicious packet will be discussed.  
4.2.1 Flooding prevention 
This discussion will focus on how the HACSS effectively 
saves time while preventing flooding. The discussion will 
be for both system’s windows: Filter and Redirect Engine 
and Authenticated Client Engine.  
4.2.1.1 Filter and Redirect Engine 
The HACSS minimises the number of processes for a re-
quest to increase the number of clients that can be served 
at a time. This can be verified in the following equation:      ,                                      (1) 
Where p is the number of processes for each single client’s 
request, s is the number of processes can system handles 
at a time. 
As seen in (1), a smaller number of processes for each 
client’s request would result in a large number of clients 
who can be served at a time n.  
As we mentioned before, HACSS only accept a single 
request from a source at a time. The HACSS makes the 
duration of time to stop the source changing dynamically 
to prevent a client from communicating with the system 
for long time, in case this client source is used in a flood-
ing attack. This dynamic time is determined depending 
on the percentage of the system’s usage.  It can be calcu-
lated as follows: 
          	         ,                                 (2) 
Where t  is the fixed blocking time for a source, c  is the 
number of clients that are serving at the time, n  is the 
number of clients that the system can serve at a time. 
In (2), when the number of clients who are served at a 
time is small, the dynamic time for blocking multiple re-
quests D will be reduced. So when the system has an abil-
ity to receive more requests, this dynamic time is reduced 
to give the client a chance to reach the system.   
4.2.1.2 Authenticated Client Engine 
 In the Authenticated Client Engine, the dynamic-multi-
points-communication mechanism is used to dropping 
flooding packets in less time.  In the (3), the number of 
clients that the system can serve at a time N consists of all 
clients’ requests from both clients and adversary attack-
ers. N       ,                           (3) 
Where  is the number of clients’ requests which the sys-
tem can serve at a time, N  is the number of adversary at-
tackers requests (from flooding attacks) which the system 
can serve at a time. 
Also number of clients that can be served at a time (N) 
can be defined depending on the system processing di-
vided by the number of processes for each request, as 
follows: N     ,                              (4) 
Where P is the number of processes that the system can 
do at a time,  is the number of processes that sys-
tem does for each request. 
So the number of processes P that the system can do at 
a time (P) can be defined as follows:     !  "  !          (5) 
The time that the system needs to handle these 
processes can be defined, as in Eq. 6 below: #         "  "     ,    (6) 
Where   is the average number of processes in each 
client’s request, " is the average number of 
processes in each adversary attacker’s request,    is time 
required to handle each process.  
In the HACSS, the communication between the client 
and the system is done through two system points: Sys-
tem and Redirect Engine and Authenticated Client En-
gine. In the rest of this section, we are going to investigate 
how the HACSS will respond to adversary attackers in 
the Authenticated Client Engine, and to analyse the time 
that the HACSS can save while preventing adversary at-
tackers: N$  %   $    ,                     (7) 
Where $  is the number of clients that the system can 
handle at a time, % is the number of client’s right re-
quests which the system can handle at a time, %"   is the 
number of adversary attackers’ requests (from flooding 
attacks) which the system can handle at a time. 
Because the implementation of the dynamic-multi-
points-communication in this part of the system, the ad-
versary attacker’s packet might not be sent to a correct IP. 
A packet is sent to a correct IP when this packet’s source 
is expected in the receiver IP.  So, some of the adversary 
attackers’ packets will be expected by the receiver IPs 
while the other will not. This can be calculated in the fol-
lowing equation:  $"  & $"'()*  +1 - &.$"/0 '()*  ,         (8) 
where I is the number of IPs, $"'()*  is the number of 
adversary attackers’ packets that are expected from the re-
ceiver IPs, $"/0 '()* is the number of adversary attack-
ers’ packets that are not expected from the receiver IPs. 
The time that the system needs to handle an adversary at-
tacker’s request #$"  can be calculated as follows us-
ing (9): #$"  $"    ,             (9) 
where $" is the average number of processes for 
each adversary attacker’s request. 
The time of handling adversary attackers’ requests #$" can be calculated using (10): 
#$"  12 +
& %"'()*  %". +1+1 - &.$"/0 '()* 1  $".13      (10) 
In the case the receiver IP is not expecting to receive the 
received packet, the packet will be dropped from its 
header, so  "/0 '()*  will be equal to 0. 
#$"  4%5'()* 6                         (11) 
So the time of processing adversary attackers’ requests or 
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packets in the HACSS, #$$"will be smaller as a result of #$" is reduced by  &  , as shown in (11) above. $$  >  
Depending on the above evaluation, the system has 
more saved time that comes from finding and dropping 
flooding attacks. So the system capability is higher to 
prevent more quantity of flooding attacks.   
4.2.2 malicious packet stopping 
In this section, the performance of the HACSS to find ma-
licious packets will be analysed.  Duration of time that the 
system needs to identify malicious packets in the pre-
vious solution (#$) can be calculated as follows in (12):  #$      ,                             (12) 
where n is the number of malicious packets,  is the du-
ration of time to check malicious packets.  
In the HACSS the duration of time to identify the mali-
cious packets (T$$) can be calculated using the following 
equation (13):  #$$    9 ,                           (13) 
where t; is the duration of time to drop the malicious 
packets.  
In the following, we are going to compare the differ-
ence between (T$) and (T$$) time:  #  #% - #%%                             (14) 
So            #     -   9                     (15) #   < - 9=                          (16) 
The time of dropping malicious packets is less than the 
time of checking packets, as below: 
  > 9                                     (17) # > 0                                      (18) 
From the above evaluation, we can see that by using 
the HACSS, we save T time for checking malicious pack-
ets. 
 5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we proposed a new security approach 
which we call the Holistic Approach for Critical System 
Security (HACSS). The HACSS is designed for critical 
systems like government systems, and it can be expanded 
to be implemented in other services systems. The new 
packet’s stamp technique, the new dynamic-multi-points-
communication mechanism, the division made in the 
client’s communications areas, and the dynamic key en-
cryption technique were included in the proposed solu-
tion. This comprehensive combination of these techniques 
makes the HACSS more powerful in preventing flooding 
attacks and stopping malicious packet attacks.  
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